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INTRODUCTION

In the seminal decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1
the Supreme Court of the United States created a qualified constitutional privilege for defendants in defamation 2 actions brought by
public officials. In a series of subsequent decisions, this privilege
was extended to suits by public figures3 and finally to actions by
individuals involved in matters of public concern. 4 Throughout this
period, increasing protection was afforded to the news media because the Court considered the necessity for the uninhibited flow
of public information to be of paramount importance.5
* B.A., University of Vermont, 1963; J.D., 1966, L.L.M., 1970, National Law Center of
The George Washington University. Member of Siff & Newman, P.C., New York City.
1 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 Defamation encompasses the torts of libel, or written defamation, and slander, or oral
defamation. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971). Defamatory words
are those "which tend to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium,
contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion
of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and
friendly intercourse in society." Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99,
102, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933). Thus, the essence of a defamation action is the alleged injury
to reputation. W. PROSSER, supra, at 739.
At common law, a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case by proving: (a) the defamatory character of the communication; (b) its publication by the defendant; (c) its application to the plaintiff; (d) that the recipient understood the communication to be defamatory;
and (e) that the recipient understood it was intended to be applied to the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 (1977). The defendant was held strictly liable because
the statements were presumed false. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353
(1975). The presumption of liability could be rebutted only if the defendant established an
affirmative defense such as truth or privilege. See W. PROSSER, supra, §§ 114-16, at 776-801.
If a defamation plaintiff was unable to prove actual injury, some courts awarded presumed
damages, those being compensation for injury "which would normally be expected to result
from publication of the statement." Eaton, supra, at 1354. Punitive damages could be assessed against the defendant upon a finding of "common law malice," defined as spite, hatred or ill-will. See W. PROSSER, supra, § 113, at 772.
3 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
4 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
5 See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
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The Court's 1974 decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'
threatened to reverse the trend favoring the media by narrowing
the class of publications protected by the privilege. In the 6 years
since Gertz, it has become apparent that the threat is now a reality. Last term, the Supreme Court decided Herbert v. Lando,7
Hutchinson v. Proxmire,8 and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,9 three cases that have the potential of exposingthe media to
greater liability. The more compelling consequence of these decisions, however, is the possibility of increasing medid self-censorship, a result contrary to the spirit of New York Times.
This Article will discuss the effects of these recent decisions on
the news media. It does not purport to be an extensive analysis of
the current substantive law of defamation. Instead, its focus is on
identifying both the real and potential problems now faced by the
defamation defense bar and its media clients.
THE PRE-GERTZ DECISIONS

People in Public Life
An understanding of the present state of the law of defamation and its effects on the media must begin with a conceptual
awareness of the evolving judicial attitude during the past 16
years. Preliminarily, an analysis of the rationale underlying the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ° is essential. New York Times not only marks the commencement of a
"federal" law of defamation," but it also begins the process
whereby emphasis, which was traditionally placed on precise
pleadings in haec verba, gradually shifted to an exploration of the
public or private status of the defamed individual.
New York Times concerned the publication of an advertisement protesting police violence and the treatment of black protestors and demonstrators. Montgomery Alabama Police Commis6 418

U.S. 323 (1974).

441 U.S. 153 (1979).
- 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
443 U.S. 157 (1979).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
i Prior to New York Times, the prevention and punishment of libelous statements was
thought "never ...
to raise any Constitutional problem." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Times Film Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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sioner Sullivan sued the Times claiming that since he was charged
with and was responsible for the police activities in question, the
false allegations of improper conduct were libelous and
actionable.12
A jury in an Alabama state court awarded Commissioner Sullivan $500,000 in damages,1 3 a verdict sustained by the Alabama Supreme Court."' The Supreme Court granted certiorari and thus
began its assault on the right of states to award damages in a libel
action concerning the conduct and performance of a public official
involved in a matter of public interest.
Mr. Justice Brennan analyzed the Alabama common law
which, for all practical purposes, limited the Times to a defense
based almost exclusively on "truth."1 5 Speaking for six members of
the Court, he expressed "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include.., sharp attacks on governmental and public officials."1 " The Court clearly
and concisely recognized the right of a newspaper to publish erroneous statements without fearing the imposition of strict liability.17 The Court noted that all errors could not be prevented and
22

13

376 U.S. at 256-57.
Id. at 256. The trial judge charged the jury that the statements in the advertisement

were libelous per se and the defendants were not protected by any privilege. The defendants
therefore could be held liable if the jury found that they had published the statements and
if the advertisement was "of and concerning" the plaintiff. Id. at 262. The court refused to
charge the jury that they must be convinced of the defendant's actual intent to harm in
order to award punitive damages. The defendants' request that a verdict for the plaintiff
differentiate between compensatory and punitive damages was also refused. Id.
14 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962). The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's ruling that the statements were libelous per se. Id. at 673, 144 So. 2d at 37. The
court also refused to overturn the verdict as excessive. It stated that malice could be inferred, inter alia,from the Times' irresponsibility in failing to verify the facts in the advertisement with the articles on the subject contained in their files, and from their failure to
print a retraction requested by the plaintiff. Id. at 686-87, 144 So. 2d at 50-51. The defendants' argument that the advertisement was political and therefore protected by the Bill of
Rights was rejected by the Alabama Supreme Court, stating that "[t]he First Amendment
. . . does not protect libelous publications." Id. at 676, 144 So. 2d at 40.
15376 U.S. at 267. Since the words were libelous per se, the defendants' only defense
was to prove their truthfulness. While the defendants might have asserted the privilege of
fair comment, the success of that defense also depended on the truth of the facts commented upon. Id.
:1 Id. at 270.
7 Id. at 279-80. It has been suggested that although the term "chilling effect" was not
used in its discussion, the Court nevertheless applied the concept in its analysis of the deterrence created by requiring libel defendants to demonstrate truth. See Note, The Chilling
Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69 COLuM. L. REv. 808, 825 (1969). "Chilling effect" has been
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therefore "must be protected if the [constitutional] freedom of expression are to have . . . 'breathing space.'-"I
Consistent with this approach, the Court held that a public
official could not recover damages for the publication of a defamatory falsehood unless the plaintiff established that the publication
was made with "actual malice.""9 A "qualified privilege ' 20 prohibdefined as focusing "attention on the practical consequences of State action for the conduct
of the individual." Id. at 808. Courts have used the term to describe the way certain forms
of state action inhibit the individual's exercise of his first amendment rights without actually prohibiting the exercise of them as such. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 48687 (1960).
Is376 U.S. at 271-72. Justice Brennan stated that "[aluthoritative interpretation of the
First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any
test of truth-whether administered by judges, juries or administrative officials and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker." Id. at 271. The Court also
stated that injury to the reputation of a government official did not warrant repressing
speech unless there was a "clear and present danger." Id. at 272-73.
Having found neither factual error nor defamatory content alone sufficient to suppress
speech, the Court concluded that the combination of the two also was insufficient. Id. at
273.
'9Id. at 279-80. Actual malice, defined by the New York Times Court as defendant's
knowledge of the falsity, or reckless disregard of the truth or falsity, of his publication, id. at
279-80, is distinct from "common-law malice"-defendant's ill-will, spite or hostility-which
a pre-New York Times libel plaintiff had to prove to enhance damages or to defeat a
defendant's assertion of a conditional privilege. See W. PROSSER, supra, note 2, at 794-95.
The use of the term "actual malice" caused a great deal of confusion in the lower courts and
forced the Supreme Court to reverse numerous libel judgments because common-law malice
instructions were given to the jury. See, e.g., Greenbelt Corp. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6 (1970); Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Henry v. Collins,
380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam). In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court
sought to clarify "actual malice" stating that a "reasonable-belief standard . . . is not the
same as the reckless-disregard-of-truth standard," id. at 79, and that "only those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New
York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions," id. at 74. The Court
further elaborated on the "actual malice" test in Saint Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727
(1968), stating: "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 731. See
also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971). Although adopting a subjective approach to
"actual malice," the Court has stated that expressions of good faith will not relieve a defendant of liability where, for instance, a story "is based wholly on an unverified anonymous
telephone call," Saint Amant, 390 U.S. at 732. Moreover, the Court has stated that "recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." Id. Yet despite the injection of some objectiveness into a
subjective test, the Court has practically acknowledged that ignorance can be a shield to
liability. See id. at 731-32; accord, Airlie Foundation, Inc. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,
337 F. Supp. 421, 427-28 (D.D.C. 1972).
The New York Times Court held that actual malice must be proven with "convincing
clarity." 376 U.S. at 285-86. This level of proof was restated in terms of "clear and convincing" by the Court in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971). Clear and
convincing proof relates only to actual malice; a plaintiff may prove the other elements of
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ited recovery of either actual or punitive damages, absent proof
that the false statements were made with knowledge of or with
reckless disregard of their falsity. First amendment freedoms
would not survive, the Court reasoned, if critics of official conduct
were guarantors of the veracity of all the statements they
published.2 1
Three years after the application of the "actual malice" test to
defamatory publications about the activities of public officials, the
companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated
Press v. Walker 22 provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to again express its interest in stressing the importance of the
plaintiff's "status" as the basis for fashioning new rules of constitutional magnitude. In the Butts case, an article in the Saturday
Evening Post accused the plaintiff, the University of Georgia athletic director, of conspiracy to fix a football game.23 In Walker, the
defamation by a preponderance of the evidence. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 341
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970). But see Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 275-76 (1971).
10 The belief that free communication was extremely important in certain limited circumstances led to the common-law development of privileges that, when applicable, shield a
defendant from defamation liability. Common-law defamation privileges are either absolute
or conditional. A conditional privilege can be defeated by a showing of "common law malice," whereas an absolute privilege cannot be defeated regardless of the defendant's motives.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 114, at 776-77. For a discussion of absolute and conditional
privileges see, 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 5.22-28; Eaton, supra note 2,
at 1361-63; Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 875, 917-31 (1956).
The fair comment privilege is extensively discussed in Sowle, Defamation and the First
Amendment: The Case for a ConstitutionalPrivilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469
(1979).
21 376 U.S. at 279. The Court believed that requiring government critics to "guarantee
the truth of all his factual assertions" would lead to self-censorship. Id. "Under such a rule,
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though
it is believed to be true, and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can
be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so." Id.
One commentator has noted that New York Times lacks language indicating the balancing of interests traditionally used in first amendment cases. See Kalven, The New York
Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT.
REV. 191, 214-17. The Court, however, did not grant libel defendants an absolute privilege
and thus impliedly balanced the interest in reputation against the interest in free expression. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
22 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
22 Id. at 135. Although the University of Georgia was a state college, Butts was employed by a private corporation, the Georgia Athletic Association. Butts, therefore, cotld
not be a "public official." Id. He was, however, a well-known coach and was negotiating for a
position with a professional football team at the time the article was published. Id. at 13536. Butts brought a libel action seeking compensatory and punitive damages totaling
$10,000,000. Id. at 137. The only defense raised at trial was one of substantial truth, since
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plaintiff was a retired United States Army General, whose objections to the admission of James Meredith as the first University of
Mississippi black student were the subject of an Associated Press
dispatch stating that he had taken command of a riotous crowd
and led a charge against United States Marshalls.24
Although both plaintiffs had received widespread recognition
and notoriety, neither was a "public official" engaged in official
conduct or activities. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court applied the
New York Times doctrine, requiring proof of actual malice, to
each, because of their status as "public figures.

'2 5

Significantly,

the case was tried and completed prior to the New York Times decision. Id. Subsequent to
the decision in New York Times, however, the defendant moved for a new trial. The trial
court denied the motion on the grounds that New York Times was inapplicable because
Butts was not a public official and that, even if New York Times applied, the evidence at
trial was sufficient to establish that the defendant had acted with reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the accusations in the article. Id. at 138-39.
24 Although a private citizen at the time of the riot and publication, Walker had a long
career in the federal government and had engaged in political activity. Id. at 140. The article
at issue stated that Walker had encouraged rioters to use violence and had advised them
how to avoid the effects of tear gas. Id. Walker sought damages in the amount of $2,000,000.
The jury awarded the plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court,
however, found that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of "malice" and
refused to award damages. The court noted that lack of "malice" would have relieved the
defendant of liability if New York Times had been applicable. Id. at 141-42.
215Id. at 154-55. Justice Harlan, author of the plurality opinion, argued that the New
York Times seditious libel rationale for the actual malice standard should not be extended
to the new public figure because that individual's criticism does not relate to self-government. 388 U.S. at 153-54. Instead, he reasoned, the first amendment interest must be balanced against the states' interest in protecting a private individual's reputation. The state
interest was noted to diminish when the plaintiff has "sufficient access to the means of
counterargument," id. at 155, or when he has assumed the risk of liability by "thrusting...
his personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy," id. See also Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 407-09 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, rather than extending the
actual malice test to public figures, Justice Harlan found that a standard akin to gross negligence should control. 388 U.S. at 155. In contrast to the plurality approach, Chief Justice
Warren, concurring in the result, argued that the actual malice standard must be applied to
public figures because their "views and actions with respect to public issues and events are
often of as much concern to the citizen as the attitudes and behavior of 'public officials' with
respect to the same issues and events." Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Since modem
political policy decisions are now made as a result of the "blending" of government and
private economic power, "individuals . . .who do not hold public office at the moment are
nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large." Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Although three justices concurred with Justice Harlan, it was the
actual malice standard that ultimately controlled because two justices agreed with the Chief
Justice and two reiterated their New York Times position that the media should be absolutely privileged. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 393 & n. 183. It is interesting to note that the
Gertz majority adopted a public figure standard which was a hybrid of both the Harlan and
Warren approaches. See generally Note, The EditorialFunction and the Gertz Public Fig-
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General Walker's status was viewed in light of "his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex'
of an important public controversy."2 6
The Public Interest Doctrine
Once the foundation of placing emphasis upon the plaintiff's
status was established, a litany of case law developed intertwining
the plaintiff's status with the right of the public to be informed of
events of public interest.2 7 The "vortex" plaintiff, 8 whether public
official or public figure, faced the heavy burden of establishing
damages and proving actual malice by "clear and convincing"
evidence.2 9
ure Standard, 87 YALE L.J. 1723, 1731-34 (1978).
28 388 U.S. at 155.

21 See, e.g., Letter Carrier v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Time, Inc.
v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 280-82 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 266 (1971);
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6, 8 (1970); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Saint Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967) (per curiam); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383
U.S. 53 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964).
28 See note 25 supra.
2 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971) ("clear and convincing
proof"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) ("convincing clarity");
note 19 supra.
The New York Times Court devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that extending
the presumption of actual damage to reputation unacceptably burdened free speech where
the only defense was truth. 376 U.S. at 283-84. Thus, some courts and commentators have
asserted that in addition to proving actual malice, a defamation plaintiff subject to the New
York Times standard must also prove actual damages. See, e.g., Lundstrom v. Winnebago
Newspapers, Inc., 58 Ill. App. 2d 33, 206 N.E.2d 525 (1965); Arkin & Granquist, The Presumption of General Damages in the Law of ConstitutionalLibel, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1482,
1493 (1968). In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), the Court applied
the New York Times actual malice test, by analogy, to a defamation action arising out of a
labor dispute. See id. at 65. Therein, the Court stated that it was limiting "the availability
of state remedies for libel to those instances in which the complainant can show that the
defamatory statements were circulated with malice and caused him damage." Id. at 64-65
(emphasis supplied). Since the Court borrowed the actual malice and actual damages requirements from New York Times by analogy, it has often been asserted that New York
Times requires proof of actual damages. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 1389. Several courts,
however, refused to apply the Linn actual damage requirement to cases falling under New
York Times. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 340 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 256-57, 259
N.E.2d 651, 667-68, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930 (1970). This area was further clouded by the
dictum in Justice White's concurrence in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 59
(1971) (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated that:
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One year after its decision in Butts and Walker, the Supreme
Court further refined the actual malice test. Emphasis shifted
slightly to the subjective awareness of the persons responsible for
the publication of the alleged defamation.3 0 The test was not
whether a reasonable man would have published or would have investigated before publishing. Rather, a far more stringent standard
was applied: "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication.""
Under this test, neither ill will 2 nor intent to inflict harm 3
was to be considered conclusive. Moreover, failure to investigate
the truth or to substantiate information gained was insufficient, in
itself, to show actual malice.3 4 There could not be reckless disregard of truth where a false report was based upon a good faith,
rational misinterpretation of something newsworthy 5 or where the
[I]t would seem that at least five members of the Court would support each of the
following rules:
For public officers and public figures to recover for damages to their reputations for libelous falsehoods, they must prove either knowing or reckless disregard
of the truth . . . . In all actions for libel or slander, actual damages must be
proved.
Id.; see Keeton, Some Implications of the ConstitutionalPrivilege to Defame, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 59, 62-63 (1972).
Although the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), clarified the
issue with respect to private individuals by requiring proof of actual injury, see id. at 349, it
is still not clear whether public officials or figures must prove actual damages in light of
Linn. There are, however, strong arguments against requiring such a burden. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 2, at 1389-90.
30 See Saint Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
31 Id.; see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964). In Saint Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Supreme Court declared that "reckless conduct is not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before
publishing." Id. at 731. Rather, reckless conduct depends upon the defendant's subjective
state of mind. Id. The Court conceded that use of a subjective reckless disregard test might
further limit the number of successful defamation plaintiffs but stated that such a test was
necessary "to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs."
Id. at 731-32; see note 19 supra.
32 See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252 (1974); Greenbelt Coop.
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 9-10 (1970); Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389
U.S. 81, 82 (1967) (per curiam); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 81 (1966); Henry v. Collins,
380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (per curiam); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964).
" Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (per curiam).
31 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964); see note 19 supra.
31 See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290-92 (1971); Waskow v. Associated Press, 462
F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But cf. Time Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 458-60 (1976)
(defendant held liable to non-public figure for erroneously interpreting court's ambiguous
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plaintiff was not contacted to verify facts.-" Finally, reliance on information from a normally reliable source negated the possibility
37
of actual malice.
The Shift to the Private Person
As the pendulum continued to swing in favor of providing increasing protection to the publisher of defamatory material, a
8 bridged
sharply divided Court, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,"
another gap when it applied the actual malice standard of knowing
falsity or reckless disregard of the truth to a libel action brought
by a plaintiff in a previously unprotected status-the "private individual. 3 9 A plurality of the Court found that concern over the
plaintiff's status, which was the cornerstone of New York Times,
Butts, Walker, and their progeny, was less important than, and
must be subordinated to, the public's right to be informed of plaintiff's involvement in matters of public or general interest. As Justice Brennan explained:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is
decree as granting divorce on grounds of adultery).
36

Hurley v. Northwest Publication Co., 273 F. Supp. 967, 974 (D. Minn. 1967), afl'd,

398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356 (2d Cir.
1971).
37 Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356, 357-58 (2d Cir. 1971); Walker v. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 394 F.2d 800, 805-06 (8th Cir. 1968); Trails West, Inc. v. Wolff, 32 N.Y.2d
207, 219, 298 N.E.2d 52, 57-58, 344 N.Y.S.2d 863, 872 (1973); Schneph v. New York Post
Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 1011, 1011-12, 213 N.E.2d 309, 309, 265 N.Y.S.2d 897, 897 (1965). See also
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 56 (1971).
38 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
39 Id. at 31. Rosenbloom was an action based on two series of radio broadcasts. The
plaintiff, a distributor of nudist magazines, was arrested while delivering some of his
magazines to a local newsstand. Id. at 32-33. Reporting on the arrest, the defendant radio
station failed to describe the materials seized as "allegedly" obscene. Id. at 33-34. This
omission was corrected in subsequent broadcasts of the same news item. Id. at 34. The
second series of allegedly defamatory broadcasts related to the defendant's report of the
lawsuit brought by the plaintiff seeking a judgment that his magazines were not obscene and
prohibiting further police 'interference with his business. Id.
The Rosenbloom plaintiff alleged that the characterization of his books as being obscene in the first series of broadcasts was libelous per se and had been proved false by his
subsequent acquittal. Id. at 36. The second series was alleged to have been defamatory because the defendant referred to the plaintiff as a "smut distributor" and described the lawsuit as an attempt to force the police and district attorney "to lay off the smut literature
racket." Id.
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in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant
and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the
participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. . . . We honor the
commitment to robust debate on public issues, which is embodied
in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection
to all discussion and communication involving matters of public
or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.40
GERTZ AND BEYOND

The Retreat
The Rosenbloom rationale, coupled with a rule favoring summary judgment in defamation cases,4 1 extended the progressive
pendulum to a short-lived peak. 2 Within 3 years after extending
the actual malice test not only from public status to private status
but to the concept of the public's right to be informed, new ground
rules were established. The Supreme Court, which in Rosenbloom
had struggled with abandoning the plaintiff's status as being of
primary importance, reaffirmed such status as being critical in
40 Id. at 43-44. Justice Brennan stated that New York Times and its progeny clearly
established "the concept that the First Amendment's impact upon state libel law derives not
so much from whether the plaintiff is a 'public official,' 'public figure,' or 'private individual,' as it derives from the question whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a
matter of public or general interest." Id. at 44. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
joined in Justice Brennan's opinion.
In accordance with his position in previous "constitutional" defamation cases, Justice
Black concurred in the result in Rosenbloom on the ground that the first amendment does
not permit the recovery of a libel judgment against the news media even when the statements are made with knowledge of their falsity. 403 U.S. at 57 (Black, J., concurring). Justice White wrote a separate opinion concurring on the ground that absent a showing of
actual malice, the press has a privilege to comment upon the official actions of public servants. Id. at 62 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan dissented, stating that states should define for themselves the applicable
standard of care for private individuals provided liability without fault was not imposed. He
also stated that plaintiff should be required to prove actual damages and that punitive damages should be awarded only upon a showing of actual malice. Id. at 64, 73 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall agreed with the conclusion of Justice Harlan that the states
should be able to formulate their own standard of liability. He disagreed, however, with
allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive damages. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart joined in Justice Marshall's dissent.
41 See notes 131-34 and accompanying text
infra.
42 For an extensive compilation of federal and state courts which adopted the Rosenbloom plurality's holding, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 377 n.10 (1974)
(White, J., dissenting).
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.4 The Court chose to refine and reemphasize the plaintiff's status, however, rather than to alter the definition of actual malice.
Apparently troubled by the uncertainty engendered by the Rosenbloom opinion," the Court in Gertz retreated from its broad
holding in Rosenbloom and produced a majority opinion.45 While
recognizing that the New York Times safeguards against self-censorship were essential, the majority concluded that the Rosenbloom plurality had over-extended the privilege by not balancing it
against "the competing value served by the law of defamation,""
which the Court described as the "legitimate state interest" in
compensating private individuals for damage to their reputations. 7
Instead of adopting an ad hoc test for balancing "the needs of the
press" against the individual's right to compensation, the Gertz
Court opted for a standard in which the respective protections
would be determined by the plaintiff's public or private status.48
The Court found "no difficulty in distinguishing among defa43 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, the plaintiff was an attorney who represented the fam-

ily of a youth slain by a Chicago police officer, Nuccio, in the family's civil action against the
officer. Id. at 325. A publication of the John Birch Society, American Opinion, had printed
an article about a purported communist plot directed at the police, which was allegedly
manifested in the criminal trial of Nuccio. Id. at 325-26. The article described Gertz as the

"architect" of the campaign to discredit the police and claimed that he was a member of an
organization dedicated to "the violent seizure of our government." Gertz was also branded a
"Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" in the article. Id.
44 See id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
45 Justices Stewart, Marshall and Rehnquist joined in Justice Powell's opinion. Justice
Blackmun concurred with the Court's opinion and in a eparate opinion stated that although he disagreed with the substance of the majority opinion, he was concurring because
of his interest in a clearly defined majority position that eliminates the "unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity." Id. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Dissents were filed by the remaining four justices. Chief Justice Burger favored a gradual evolution of constitutional defamation protections over the seemingly abrupt retreat in
Gertz from "traditional" defamation law, id. at 354-55 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice
Douglas, opposed to applying the uncertain negligence standard, or even a reckless disregard
standard to liability for expression, id. at 355-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting), was faithful to his
position in Rosenbloom and advocated the New York Times test as the standard of liability
for media defendants against private citizens, id. In a piercing dissent, Justice White argued
that the majority had intruded impermissibly into the sphere of the states' interest in protecting private persons by ruling strict liability unconstitutional and by imposing restrictions on damage awards. Id. at 369-404 (White, J., dissenting).
"1 Id. at 341. In support of their view that the state interest must be considered, the
Gertz Court reasoned that if media self-censorship was the only interest at stake, the New
York Times Court would have adopted a media privilege of absolute immunity. Id.
47

Id.

41Id. at 343-48.
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mation plaintiffs. ' 49 It initially noted that "the first remedy of defamation plaintiffs is 'self-help,'" that is, the ability to employ public communication to mitigate the harm caused by the defamatory
statement.5 0 Accordingly, the Gertz majority reasoned that private
individuals are more "vulnerable" to damage and thus more "deserving" of state-fashioned remedies than public officials or public
figures, who possess significant access to effective communication
channels and therefore have an opportunity to rebut the defamatory statements.5 1 More important, the Court emphasized, public
individuals "have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk
of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them," whereas
private individuals have not. The private person "has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury. 5' 2 Thus, with the
emphasis on voluntary action, akin to assumption of risk, the
Court defined three categories of public figures. First are those individuals who "through no purposeful action of [their] own" have
achieved this status, but this "truly involuntary public figure" was
noted as being a rarity.53 The second category are those deemed
"public figures for all purposes," who, by the "notoriety of their
achievements, 5 4 by "occupy[ing] positions of . . . persuasive
power and influence, ' 55 or by "achiev[ing] . . .pervasive fame or
notoriety,"5 have acquired "general fame and notoriety in the
community. '5 7 The "more common" public figures, those classified
as public figures "for a limited range of issues,"5 8 comprise the
third category. These are individuals who "have thrust themselves
to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."5 9 Both the all-purpose
and limited-issue public figures were found to have "assumed roles
of especial prominence in the affairs of society"6 0 or, phrased differently, "in the resolution of public questions"6 1 and therefore
'0 Id. at 344.

Id.
I0
I Id. at 344-45.
52 Id. at 345.
3

d.

Id. at 342.
" Id. at 345.
at 352.
' Id.
57 Id. at 351-52.
5 Id. at 351.
Id. at 345.
6IId.
" Id. at 351.
'4
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"invite attention and comment."62
Thus, if a plaintiff were cast in the role of a public personality,
the familiar defamation rules announced in New York Times
would apply. If the plaintiff defamed by the media were a private
individual, however, the states would be permitted to fashion their
own rules and standards of liability, with the caveats that strict
liability could not be imposed, 3 that presumed and punitive damages could be exacted only if New York Times actual malice was
shown, 4 and that only actual damages "supported by competent
evidence concerning the injury" could be awarded. 5
After reinstating the public-private distinction, the Gertz majority continued its assault on Rosenbloom by rejecting the "general or public interest" rationale. Not only was it deemed to be
hostile to state interests, but its application "would occasion the
*

.

.difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad

hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public
interest' and which do not-to determine.

.

. 'what information is

relevent to self-government.' "66 Beyond the difficulty in applying
of leaving these
such a rule, the Court questioned the 6' prudence
7
decisions to the "conscience of judges. "

Significantly, many plaintiffs prior to the Gertz decision likely
would have been deemed public figures.6 8 The narrowing of that
status under Gertz becomes evident in the Court's analysis of the
plaintiff's "public" activities. Noting Gertz's extensive participation in civic and professional organizations and activities and his
numerous legal publications, the majority "would not lightly assume" that such endeavors convert an individual into a public
figure for all purposes. 69 Emphasizing that the jurors had never
heard of the plaintiff prior to trial, the Court concluded that there
was no "clear evidence" of his "general fame and notoriety in the
community.17 0 Nor could the Court deem him a limited-issue pub-

lic figure, since the test "look[s] to the nature and extent of an
62

Id. at 345.

63Id. at 347.
1,Id. at 349.

61Id. at 350.
66Id. at 346 (citation omitted).

Id.
68 See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tnx. L. REv. 422, 449 n. 136
67

(1975).
69 418 U.S. at 351-52.
70

Id. at 352.
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individual's participation in the particular [public] controversy giving rise to the defamation."' 1 Turning to the facts in Gertz, the
majority reasoned that the plaintiff had neither participated in the
criminal trial that set the stage for the defamatory remarks nor
discussed the prosecution or civil litigation with the press and thus
had neither "thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor
. . .engage[d] the public's attention in an attempt to influence the
72
outcome.
The significance of the Gertz decision, beyond redefining defamation law and retrenching from short-lived advances in press
freedoms, 73 was the creation of new first amendment terminology,
which, for the most part, was not clearly defined. Now, New York
Times protection was to be determined by one's "general fame or
notoriety in the community," apparently contoured by any one activity or any combination of widely-known activities7 4 or by "voluntary injection" into a "public controversy" in an attempt "to influence its outcome." The plaintiff's participation in the particular
controversy is to be measured by the "nature and extent of his
activity." Moreover, although the court acknowledged the possibility of an involuntary public figure, 5 that category of public figure
was not addressed in the Gertz analysis. Nor did the Court explain
how the inquiry whether a particular event is a "public controversy" would avoid the ad hoc determinations it sought to shun by
summarily rejecting the Rosenbloom "matters of public and general interest" standard, a problem exacerbated by the Court's failure to distinguish clearly between the terms.76
The Pendulum Continues to Swing
Many of the questions left unanswered in Gertz were to be
7 7
analyzed 2 years later in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
wherein a libel
suit was based upon an allegedly defamatory report of a divorce
proceeding.78 The defendant claimed that the plaintiff, Mrs. FireId.
Id.
73 See notes 106-08 and accompanying text infra.
74 See notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
71 418 U.S. at 351.
78 See generally Eaton, supra note 2, at 1423-25.
77 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
78 In the original Florida action, Mr. Firestone's counterclaim for divorce was granted.
Although he alleged adultery and extreme cruelty, the court, in a confusing opinion, apparently granted the divorce on grounds of the Firestones' lack of domestication. To justify its
71
72
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stone, was a public figure since she was the wife of the internationally known tire manufacturer, was "prominent among the '400' of
Palm Beach society," was an "active [member] of the sporting
set," and had received sufficient media coverage and publicity so as
to "warrant her subscribing to a press-clipping service. '7
Despite these obvious public acts and activities, the Supreme
Court held that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure for the purpose of her divorce proceeding.8 0 The restrictive analysis previously
applied in Gertz and the demise of the Rosenbloom rationale were
clearly sounded. The Firestone Court rejected the argument that
the highly publicized divorce proceeding was a "public controversy" notwithstanding its popularity to the reading public;8 1 to
hold otherwise would be a restatement of the Rosenbloom doctrine,
which the Gertz Court had "repudiated." 2 Moreover, the Court
reasoned, the plaintiff did not "freely choose to publicize" the divorce, and resort to the legal system cannot be interpeted as being
"voluntary." 3 Furthermore, that Mrs. Firestone had held several
press conferences "in an attempt to satisfy inquiring reporters"
was considered insignificant by the Court, since they were not used
holding, the court stated that Mrs. Firestone's extra-marital affairs were of a nature that
would have made "Dr. Freud's hair curl," while her husband's level of activity was compared to "the erotic zest of a satyr." Id. at 450-51. This language was mimicked in the Time
article that became the subject matter of the defamation action. Mrs. Firestone requested
Time to retract the statements, but such was refused because Time believed that the report
was factually correct. Id. at 452.
79 Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 454.

1 Id.
82 Id.

In rejecting the public figure argument, the Court stated:
Petitioner contends that because the Firestone divorce was characterized by the
Florida Supreme Court as a "cause celebre," it must have been a public controversy and respondent must be considered a public figure. But in so doing petitioner seeks to equate "public controversy" with all controversies of interest to the
public. Were we to accept this reasoning, we would reinstate the doctrine advanced in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom. . . .In Gertz, however, the Court
repudiated this position ....

Id.

asId. The Court stated that Mrs. Firestone's publicity arose because she had been
"compelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain legal release from the bonds of
matrimony." Id. Quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971), the Court reaffirmed that "[r]esort to the judicial process . . . is no more voluntary in a realistic sense
than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in court." Id. In apparent
recognition that this statement, taken alone, would conflict with the public figure holding in
Butts, the Court"distinguished Mrs. Firestone's conduct from General Walker's by simply
holding that "[sihe assumed no 'special prominence in the resolution of public questions.'
424 U.S. at 454-55. (citation omitted).
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to influence the divorce proceedings or "some unrelated controversy.

'8 4

Thus, since Mrs. Firestone had not assumed a role "of

especial prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps
Palm Beach society, and did not thrust herself to the forefront of
any particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it," she could not be considered a
public figure.85
The Fall of the Involuntary Public Figure: The Recent Decisions
The Court's decision in Firestone left little doubt that public
figure status could not easily be achieved. It lent credence to the
Gertz Court's prediction that the public figure for all purposes
would be uncommon. Of greater import was the barrier presented
by the two-tiered test for achieving limited public figure status.
Not only must there be a public controversy, but the individual
must purposely and extensively participate in it.
In two recent decisions, Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association

6

8 7
and Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
the Supreme Court reaf-

firmed the Firestone criteria and made all but extinct the concept
of "involuntary" public figures. 8 In Hutchinson, the plaintiff re424 U.S. at 454 n.3.
85 Id.

at 453. Justice Marshall dissented in Firestone, arguing that Mrs. Firestone's

public activities converted her into a Gertz public figure. Id. at 484-89 (Marshall, J., dissent-

ing). He noted that prior to the lawsuit, her jet-set activities and marital problems had been
a constant attraction for the local media and public. Moreover, he added, she had reason to
know that the commencement of the suit would be publicized. The 17-month trial was covered by national news and was the subject of at least 88 local newspaper stories, and she
held numerous press conferences throughout this period. Justice Marshall maintained that
these activities met the Gertz public figure requirements of self-help and voluntary participation in a public controversy. Id. at 485-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He also rejected the
majority's consideration of whether a highly publicized divorce proceeding was a public controversy. In determining public controversies by examining the subject matter of an alleged
defamation, it was argued, the Court has returned to the Rosenbloom plurality position rejected in Gertz. "If Gertz is to have any meaning at all, the focus of the analysis must be on
the actions of the individual, and the degree of public attention that had already developed,
or that could have been anticipated, before the report in question." Id. at 489 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Under this inquiry, he concuded, Mrs. Firestone was clearly a public figure. Id.
88 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
87

443 U.S. 111 (1979).

88 It has been suggested that the involuntary public figure concept met its demise in
Firestone. See Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 551, 559 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
("[It appears to this Court that.

.

.Firestone.

.

.forecloses the possibility of one becom-

ing an involuntary figure.").
It is interesting to note that between Gertz and Firestone, the Supreme Court considered two cases in which the plaintiffs arguably were involuntary figures. In both cases, how-
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search scientist, whose research was supported by federal grants,
was a recipient of Senator William Proxmire's "Golden Fleece of
the Month Award," a vehicle that the senator used "to publicize
what he perceived to be the most egregious examples of wasteful
government spending."8 9 The senator also criticized the plaintiff's
research in a press release, newsletter, television interview, and
Senate speech.9 0 Both the district court and circuit court of appeals concluded that Hutchinson was a limited public figure, reasoning that he had successfully applied for research grants and
that he had media access that enabled him to respond to the announcement of the award. The Supreme Court reversed the previous grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding
that neither of the facts relied upon by the lower courts proved
that Hutchinson was a public figure prior to the controversy surrounding the award, and "[h]e did not have the regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the accouterments of having
become a public figure." 91 Addressing whether a public controversy
was involved, the Court reasoned that "concern about general public expenditures" is not such an event. 2 Additionally, the plaintiff
had neither "thrust himself [n]or his views into public controversy
to influence others,"9' 3 nor "assumed any role of public prominence
in the broad question of concern about expenditures."9'
The Wolston decision, decided on the same day as Hutchinson, is further, if not conclusive, evidence of the demise of the involuntary public figure. The plaintiff in Wolston sued the publishers and author of a 1974 non-fiction book that had identified the
plaintiff as an indicted Soviet espionage agent. The record demonstrated that in 1958 the plaintiff had failed to appear before a fedever, that queston was not reached. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245
(1974); Gordon v. Random House, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa. 1972), vacated, 486 F.2d
1356 (3d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 812 (1974).
89 443 U.S. at 114.
90 Id. at 115-18.
91Id. at 136.
92 Id.
at 135. Reasoning that by labelling "concern about general public expenditures"
as a public controversy would be a return to the rejected Rosenbloom subject matter test,
and that, by so classifying, all persons who "received or benefitted" from public grants
would be a public figure, the Court rejected that part of Proxmire's public figure argument.

Id.

'93Id.
1, Id.
Merely applying for federal funding or publishing in professional publications,
the Court reasoned, does not "[invite] that degree of public attention and comment" to give
one public figure status. Id.
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eral grand jury that was investigating his knowledge of a suspected
spy ring. He later responded to a criminal contempt order to show
cause, at which time he pleaded guilty and was sentenced. 5 These
events attracted the news media's attention, resulting in the publication of fifteen newspaper articles in New York and Washington.
The publicity subsided following the sentencing, and the plaintiff
returned to private life.9 6
Although the statements about the plaintiff were found to be
false, the lower federal courts agreed that the plaintiff was a limited-issue public figure and, finding no actual malice, respectively
granted and affirmed the defendants' motion for summary judgment. In reversing, the Supreme Court accepted the defendant's
contention that the public controversy involved was "the propriety
of the actions of law-enforcement officials in investigating and
prosecuting suspected Soviet agents, '9 7 but it did not agree that
Wolston had achieved public figure status. The Court rejected the
lower courts' rationales that by failing to appear at the hearing
Wolston had "stepped center front into the spotlight," thereby
"invit[ing] attention and comment in connection with the public
questions involved in the investigation of espionage." 98 Rather, it
found that such activity did not amount to a "voluntary
thrust[ing]" or "inject[ing]." 9 9 The Court hinted, however, that
Wolston might qualify as an involuntary figure: "It would be more
accurate to say that petitioner was dragged unwillingly into the
10 0
controversy. The government pursued him in its investigation."
The inquiry into involuntariness did not proceed further, though,
and the Court returned to the "nature and extent" of Wolston's
voluntariness. Failing to comply with the subpoena, even with
knowledge of the potential attendant publicity, was
not decisive on the question of public figure status ....
[Pletitioner never discussed this matter with the press and limited his involvement to that necessary to defend himself of the
contempt charge. It is clear that [he] played only a minor role in
443 U.S. at 161-63.
"

Id. at 163.

Id. at 166 n.8. Although the Court had difficulty identifying the particular public
controversy involved, it accepted the defendant's definition because "it is clear that petitioner fails to meet the other [public figure] criteria." Id.
9" Id. at 165 (quoting Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir.
1979)).
: 443 U.S. at 166.
,oo Id.
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whatever public controversy there may have been concerning the
investigation of Soviet espionage. We decline to hold that his
mere citation for contempt rendered him a public figure for purposes of comment on the investigation of Soviet espionage. 10 1
Moreover, the Court stated that the mere involvement in a
public controversy does not transform a private individual into a
public person so as to impose upon him the rigorous burden of
proving actual malice by clear and convincing evidence:
Petitioner's failure to appear before the grand jury and citation for contempt no doubt were "newsworthy," but the simple
fact that these events attracted media attention also is not conclusive of the public-figure issue. A private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public
attention. To accept such reasoning would in effect re-establish
the [now repudiated] doctrine advanced by the plurality opinion
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 02
The Court additionally rejected the notion that the plaintiff
had used the contempt order "as a function to create public discussion about [the public controversy]" in order to assume "special
prominence in resolution of public issues." 10 3 Nor is "any person
who engages in criminal conduct automatically. . . a public figure
for purposes of comment on a limited range of issues relating to his
conviction."'1 Thus, concluded the Court, the plaintiff was not a
public figure because, "[to] hold otherwise would create an 'open
season' for all who sought to defame persons convicted of a
0 5
crime.",1
FUTURE OBSERVATIONS

The impact of Gertz and its progeny will be seen in a number
of areas related to defamation litigation involving media defendants. Primarily, these effects are the potential for an increase in
media self-censorship, an increase in the number of defamation actions and their attendant costs, first amendment forum shopping,
and the demise of the use of summary judgment in these actions.
101 Id. at 167.
102

Id.

103 Id. at 168 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
104 Id.
101 Id. at 169.
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Media Self-Censorship
At the heart of the Court's defamation decisions from New
York Times to Rosenbloom was the concept that free and uninhibited debate of public issues was essential for the proper governing
and development of our democratic system. Any doctrine which
would impede such discussion was deemed inimical to our conception of self-government and societal advancement. Thus, first
amendment freedoms were construed to limit the potential for litigation and to avoid the dangers of self-censorship. With the placing of emphasis on the public's right to be informed and on the
corresponding need to prevent a "chilling" of the flow of public
information, the transition from the New York Times and Butts
status tests to the Rosenbloom content standard-a shifting of first
amendment analysis which brought with it an increased safeguarding of the media-appeared to be a logical progression.
Gertz and its progeny represent a departure from this trend.
Under their public controversy-public figure standard, the security
in reporting that the media enjoyed under pre-Gertz law apparently will be replaced by an awareness that publications once covered by the New York Times privilege, in many instances, will not
be protected under Gertz. This awareness, combined with the potential for increased litigation costs 0 6 and the threat of inconsistent state holdings,'10 7 probably will be translated into self-censorship. For example, nearly all media publications at issue in the
short-lived Rosenbloom era were found to be subject to the qualified privilege and thus protected by "federal" defamation jurisprudence. 10 8 By abandoning the Rosenbloom rationale and returning
to a status test apparently stricter than that envisioned by the
Butts plurality, Gertz and the subsequent decisions in Firestone,
Hutchinson, and Wolston have effectively taken media protection
from the sphere of federal law and placed it into the labyrinth of
state law, where "actual malice," in most cases, has been replaced
by ordinary negligence. 09 Rather than chance the plaintiff's lower
burden under state standards, the media will often be forced to
delete stories that might subject them to liability. If Gertz fosters
:06
10

See notes 122-30 and accompanying text infra.
See Frakt, Defamation Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common

Law, 10 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 518, 560 (1979).

'os See authorities cited in Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and FirstAmend-

ment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 915, 927 n.99 (1978). See also note 42 supra.
.o See note 145 and accompanying text infra.
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both a bias in favor of orthodox media reporting and augmented
censorship by libel attorneys, 110 the probability of self-censorship
increases.
One of the major effects of the post-Gertz decisions on the
news media is their restrictive interpretations of the requirements
for achieving public figure status. Analysis of these decisions
reveals the elusive nature of the public figure concept as it is presently applied. First, the number of all-purpose public figures apparently will be minute, a point acknowledged by the Court itself. 11 Moreover, the Court's definition of this species of public
figures, i.e., those who hold "positions of. . . persuasive power and
influence" or who have "achieve[d] . . . pervasive fame or notori-

ety" and thus "general fame or notoriety in the community," indicates that it is the media's coverage of these personalities that results in the requisite notoriety. Ironically, if the media begins
censoring publications concerning newsworthy individuals who
have not yet reached the exposure level of a Johnny Carson 112 or
Mayor Alioto11 3 for fear of potential litigation, the probability
is
11
small that new all-purpose public figures will be created.

4

Second, the concept of an involuntary public figure is hypothetical at best. The Court has not clearly defined this status,11 5
and even where it has recognized that a private person may have
been drawn into the public spotlight, it has failed to decide, or
even address, the status question in terms of the involuntariness of
that individual's public exposure. 1 Apparently, merely being
drawn into a particular controversy will not suffice; once drawn in,
the "nature and extent" of an individual's participation may have
See Anderson, supra note 68, at 438-41, 453-58.
"
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
112 See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
113 See Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
n1 See generally Frakt, supra note 107, at 531-32.
I'5 The Gertz Court described the involuntary public figure as "someone [who may become] a public figure through no purposeful action of his own. . ." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345,
and "is drawn into a particular public controversy," id. at 351. This "definition" was neither
expanded upon by the Gertz Court nor even mentioned in Wolston and Hutchinson. The
uncertainty engendered by the hypothetical possibility of an involuntary public figure is
reflected in lower court decisions. Compare Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d
859 (5th Cir. 1978) with Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Mich.
1979). See also Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d
Cir. 1977).
n" See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
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to be voluntary. In Wolston, for example, the plaintiff clearly was
drawn into the public controversy by both the government and the
media. Once in the spotlight, however, he never actively sought
publicity and his public activities were limited to responding to the
contempt charges. 1"7
The prospect of being deemed an involuntary public figure is
further complicated by the Court's insistence that one may become
a public figure in only one of two ways-by having general fame or
notoriety or by voluntarily thrusting oneself into the controversy
and attaining continuing media access regarding the limited issue. 11 8 Taking this literally, even if the WoIston plaintiff had actively engaged the media after having become involved in the controversy, but prior to the alleged defamation, by definition he
could not have become an involuntary public figure, nor could he
have been deemed a voluntary public figure because he had not
thrust himself into the controversy in the first instance. Yet, he
may have nevertheless become a public figure because of his voluntary involvement with the media.
Overcoming the two-tiered test for limited-issue public figure
status will prove to be formidable. At the outset, the events that
constitute public controversies are uncertain. The Court has offered little guidance other than stating that the Rosenbloom concept of newsworthiness is an inappropriate analytical starting place
and that a highly publicized divorce proceeding, a newsworthy
criminal prosecution and concern about federal expenditures are
not such controversies. Accordingly, definitions of public controversy apparently will turn on the particular issues the individual
courts subjectively view as being publicly important. Thus, the
courts will be making ad hoc "moralistic value-laden" choices of
issues "with which society, and thus the media, should be concerned," 19 a result which the Gertz Court sought to avoid. As one
commentator has noted, the potential for media self-censorship increases dramatically under the public controversy standard because the press initially will have to make these subjective predictions. 12 0 Even if a public controversy is determined to exist, the
actions that will constitute sufficient voluntary conduct for
"thrusting" purposes remain uncertain. Under Firestone and WolWolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
1 See id. at 166.
:9 Frakt, supra note 107, at 528-29.
'

20

Id. at 529-30.
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ston, it is clear that resort to the judicial system for resolution of a
marital dispute or appearing in court to defend against criminal
charges, respectively, are not the type of voluntary activities envisioned. Nor will merely being drawn into a controversy by the defendant's defamation or by the media or other third parties be
considered voluntary.
Attempting to reconcile the uncertainties of the post-Gertz decisions by analyzing the Court's definitions of the Gertz terminology can leave one bewildered. Apparently, a broader analysis is required. Under such an approach, it would appear that no matter
how an individual becomes involved in a public controversy, save
for being drawn in by the defamation, he may achieve public figure
status by actively and extensively engaging in conduct bound to
"invite attention and comment", i.e., voluntarily increasing the
"nature and extent" of his participation.1 2 1 At that point, the media apparently can assume that the person risks exposure to the
media. It is clear, however, that merely responding to reporters'
inquiries about the controversy into which he had been drawn will
not be deemed voluntary. Of course, this entire inquiry is irrelevent if there was no public controversy.
The result of these decisions, then, is that the New York
Times privilege now may be limited to those publications concerning public officials, the "rare," all-purpose public figure, and the
restricted class of persons who voluntarily draw public attention to
their involvement in a particular controversy. The potential for
media liability therefore increases because the class of plaintiffs
who must carry the heavy burden of proving actual malice significantly decreases. To avoid exposure to this augmented liability, the
media likely will have to engage in expanded self-censorship-deleting those potentially defamatory stories involving individuals who do not fit precisely into the "safe" categories.
Although the Gertz Court noted that public figures may be able to effectively rebut
defamatory statements because of their access to the media, see 418 U.S. at 344, the postGertz decisions clearly indicate that a private individual's media access, no matter how extensive, is not by itself determinative of his constitutional status. Firestone clearly illustrates this conclusion. Notwithstanding the extensive media coverage of Mrs. Firestone's
activities, and her press-clipping service, press conferences, and association with her nationally known husband-all indicia of extensive media access-the Court held that she was not
121

a public figure.
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The Potential for Litigation

The anxiety created by the public figure limitations expressed
in Firestone was heightened in 1979 when media defendants suffered setbacks on several fronts. Not only was the plaintiff's status
becoming more restrictively defined, 22 but even where such public
figure status was conceded, relief for the media proved to be an
elusive concept. In Herbert v. Lando,2l 3 the Supreme Court held
that the media was not protected or privileged during pre-trial discovery from inquiries into the "state of mind" of the defendants
involved in the editorial process that resulted in the allegedly defamatory publication, provided such inquiry was relevant to the
124
plaintiff's proof of actual malice.
Notwithstanding that the Lando decision may have a chilling
effect on editorial functioning, 25 the plaintiff's burden of proving
New York Times actual malice may appear to be lightened by permitting such extensive discovery.' 2 This perception may encourage
122 Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979).
123 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Herbert, a retired army officer, had served active duty in Viet-

nam. During 1969-1970 he received extended news coverage as a consequence of accusing his
superiors of covering-up war crimes and atrocities. Id. at 155-56. In 1973, on the television
show "60 Minutes," a segment was included on Herbert and his accusations. Claiming that
the show had "falsely and maliciously portrayed him as a liar," Herbert brought the libel
action against Lando, the producer and author of a related article, Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., the network, Mike Wallace, the announcer, and Atlantic Monthly, the publisher of Lando's article. Id.
12t Id.
at 171-72. The thrust of the Herbert Court's discussion focused on cases decided
prior to New York Times that inquired into the defendants' state of mind during the editorial process. These decisions developed qualified privileges to protect publishers from liability for defamation when no malice was shown. Id. at 163-64; see, e.g., Nalle v. Oyster, 230
U.S. 165 (1913). According to these opinions, in order to find malice the plaintiff had to
show that the defendant acted with an unacceptable motive. Sometimes this motive was
displayed by ill-will, sometimes by the author's intent or purpose, and other times by a
showing of negligence. To find this motive, state of mind inquiry was imperative. 441 U.S. at
164 & n.12. The Court also noted that numerous courts had accepted state of mind evidence
without facing constitutional objections. Id. at 165. For a list of these cases see 441 U.S. at
165 n.15.
125 See generally Frakt, supra note 107, at 534; The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93
HARv. L. REv. 149 (1979).
226 Prior to Lando, whether a media defendant's editorial processes were completely
immunized from an adversary's pretrial inquiry was uncertain. Although pre-New York
Times cases indicated that state of mind evidence is relevant proof of common-law malice,
see cases cited in Lando, 441 U.S. at 165 n.15, subsequent decisions did not expressly extend
this rule to New York Times actual malice inquiries. Cf. id. at 173 n.21 (Often . . . the
defendant . . . first presents . . . direct evidence about the editorial process . . . to establish. . . lack of malice.") (emphasis supplied). Language in two of the Court's recent media
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the belief that the chances of recovery will improve in suits against
the media-a conviction that may be fortified by the plaintiff victories in Hutchinson and Wolston. Thus, it is conceivable that the
class of potential plaintiffs now will expand. The possibility of increased litigation also becomes greater in light of the Firestone implication that the Gertz actual damages requirement in state actions may be satisfied by some evidence of mental suffering alone,
a result that apparently contravenes the Gertz holding that presumed damages may not be awarded unless the actual malice
127
standard is met.
The extensive discovery permitted by Lando as well as the potential for increased litigation and expanded liability signal a sharp
rise in litigation costs, a result which may be economically devastating in some sectors. Not all media defendants have the wheredecisions appeared to support the existence of an absolute privilege for editorial processes:
see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973), discussed in Herbert v.
Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Thus, potential plaintiffs
without direct evidence of actual malice, believing that the editorial process was privileged,
may have been dissuaded from bringing suit or may have faced early summary judgment if
the court so believed. In rejecting the possibility of an editorial process privilege, the Lando
Court disagreed with the second circuit's reliance on Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting
and construed the pre-New York Times decisions as supporting the admissibility of direct
state-of-mind evidence in actual malice cases. See Lando, 441 U.S. at 167. Although such an
interpretation may be erroneous, see The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 149,
153 & n.43 (1979), the Lando decision nevertheless removes the uncertainty engendered by
previous cases and thereby may inspire increased litigation.
127 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Although the expansive pretrial discovery process in Lando was uniformly viewed with chagrin by media advocates, see, e.g., Frakt, supra note 107; Friedenthal, Herbert v. Lando: A
Note on Discovery, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1979); The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv.
L. REV. 149 (1979). But see Franklin, Reflections on Herbert v. Lando, 31 STAN. L. REV.
1035 (1979), there are indications that media defendants will not be permitted to use for
their benefit the plaintiff's failure to utilize extensive editorial process discovery. In a separate and more recent action, the Lando defendants attempted to persuade the district court
to dismiss a defamation suit on grounds that the plaintiff had not engaged in a "wave of
discovery depositions" of those responsible for the production of the allegedly defamatory
film in question. Uhl v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1134 (W.D. Pa.
1979). The court denied the motion, declaring that this type of discovery was not always
necessary in determining the state of mind and that to hold otherwise would permit only
wealthy plaintiffs to sue in defamation. Id. at 1141. The court noted that the plaintiff was a
private person who did not seek to be on television and who had hired a small-town, solopractioner attorney. Furthermore, as a private person, he did not have to prove actual malice. The court compared this situation to the one in Herbert,where the plaintiff was a public figure who voluntarily sought and obtained media coverage and who did have to prove
actual malice. It concluded that depriving a litigant like Uhl of his day in court because he
did not engage in extensive discovery would show a "bleak prospect for American justice."
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withal of the corporate conglomerates, who view defensive litigation as no more than one of many costs of doing business. While
the concept of libel insurance has been available for years by a
limited number of companies who specialize in providing insurance
to the media, ever increasing premiums, coupled with larger retentions, have become the rule rather than the exception. 12 Consequently, the economic burden that potentially is being placed upon
small publishers is severe. 129 As the Rosenbloom rationale envisioned, "[tihe very possibility of having to engage in litigation [is]
an expensive and protracted process."130
Limitations in the Use of Summary Judgment
As previously discussed, the New York Times holding was
based, to a large extent, on the belief that large verdicts in defamation suits would have a chilling effect on public discussion.",' The
Court recognized that even the threat of litigation posed a substantial danger to the freedom of discussion on matters of public concern.1 2 Thus, as the actual malice standard became more firmly
embedded in the web of legal precedent, summary judgment for
the defendant became an especially appropriate means to swiftly
and expeditiously vindicate first amendment rights. 3 3 Use of sum128

Cf. Anderson, The Selective Impact of Libel Law, reprinted in, MASS MEDIA AND

THE SUPREME COURT 241 (S. Devol ed. 1971) (most publications and broadcasters cannot

afford libel insurance). The problems caused by the high cost of libel insurance is exacerbated by insurers requiring prospective policyholders to have fairly libel-free records, W.E.
FRANCOIS, MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION

132 (1978), or to obtain whole or partial indemnifica-

tion agreements from their authors, Anderson, supra note 68, at 433 & n.57. Other insurance
policies omit punitive damages.
129 Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 610 n.40 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing the effect of prior restraints on small newspapers).
1SoRosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52.
121 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277-79.
132 See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52-53 (quoting Speis v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958)).
13 See Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1971). Numerous federal and
state jurisdictions have recognized summary judgment to be a beneficial device in first
amendment defamation actions. According to this "rule" of granting summary judgments,
Guitar v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 538
F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976) (mem.), defamation cases should be disposed of as quickly as possible to avoid a chilling of the exercise of first amendment freedoms, see, e.g., Schuster v. U.S.
News & World Report, Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 1979); Southard v. Forbes, 588 F.2d
140, 145 (5th Cir. 1979); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 456 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Herbert v.
Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 991 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Anderson v. Stanco
Sports Library, Inc., 542 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1976); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565,
566 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Washington Post Co. v. Keough, 365 F.2d
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mary judgment in defamation actions was deemed "essential" to
avoid the evils of self-censorship and to encourage the virtue of
134
public debate.
Following the Gertz decision, concern was expressed that the
rule in favor of summary judgment might be threatened by the
Court's failure to define both actual injury and the burden necessary to prove it."'8 It was further feared that those state courts
adopting a negligence standard would be hesitant to grant summary judgment.1 3 6 The possibility that the rule would be completely "abrogated" was voiced by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Firestone.137 It was not until Lando, however, in
which the Court held that direct state of mind discovery was available,138 that the potential for abrogation of the rule became a reality. In so holding, the Lando Court may have impliedly directed
that summary judgment should not be granted prior to such extensive discovery. That the trend against use of summary judgment
had become fairly embedded was thereafter expressed in Hutchinson. In reversing a summmary judgment previously granted to the
defendant, the Court referred to its earlier decision in Lando, and
stated that the "rule" favoring summary judgment should be
reevaluated:
Considering the nuances of the issues raised here, we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called "rule." The
proof of "actual malice" calls a defendant's state of mind into
question, . . . and does not readily lend itself to summary
disposition. 3 9
Although the Supreme Court chose to avoid directly "dealing
965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp.
29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071, 1075-76 (N.D. Cal. 1969),
afl'd, 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971); Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 937
(Mass. 1979); Greenberg v. CBS, 69 App. Div. 2d 693, 700, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988, 991 (2d Dep't
1979); Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 395 A.2d 1342, 1346 (Pa. 1978). See also 6
MOORE'S, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.17140], at 56-928 n.8 (2d ed. 1976). But see Taggart v.
Wadleigh-Maurice, Ltd., 489 F.2d 434, 438 (3d Cir. 1973) (chilling effect of self-censorship
outweighed by possibly premature dismissal).
134See Washington Post Co. v. Keough, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); note 15 supra.
I" See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 68 at 467-68.
1" See id.
137Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Is 441 U.S. at 171-72.
119 99 S.Ct. at 2680 n.9 (citations omitted).
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with such complex issues" in Hutchinson,140 it is unlikely that they
will be ignored for long.14 1 It must be expected and anticipated
that litigants seeking to narrowly construe first amendment freedoms will advocate the widespread application of Herbert and
Hutchinson principles, a problem that cannot be avoided by the
court.
It is more than likely that the holding in Herbert and the dictum in Hutchinson will become familiar phrases in all first amendment motions for summary judgment. 42 As a matter of practical
consideration as well as tactical philosophy, pretrial discovery now
must be exhaustive before a motion for summary judgment is considered. Not only must the litigants engage in extensive depositions, but resort to broadly based interrogatories, notices to admit,
and the full panoply of discovery devices may be deemed essential
before a "gun shy" judiciary will summarily dispose of otherwise
43
privileged publications.
140Id.
141 See Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 71 App. Div. 2d 411, 422 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1st Dep't
1979); Greenberg v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc., 69 App. Div. 2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d
988 (2d Dep't 1979).
12 In Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), for example, the plaintiff argued that Lando requires state-of-mind evidence before summary judgment can be granted and that the Hutchinson dictum precludes summary judgment. Rejecting this reasoning, the court stated that Lando "should not be read as unraveling the
entire tapestry of First Amendment safeguards woven by the Supreme Court over the last
fifteen years," and that the Hutchinson dictum "is simply of no relevance to the present
motion [for summary judgment] which raises no issue of actual malice or state of mind." 486
F. Supp. at 371.
143 One of the major criticisms of Justice White's majority opinion in Lando was his
failure to provide trial judges with adequate guidelines for checking discovery. See The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 149, 158-61 (1979). See also 441 U.S. at 176-77.
Although three of the Justices expressed concern about the problems posed by unchecked
discovery, see id. at 179 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 191 & n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part); id. at 199 (Stewart, J., dissenting), it was Justice Brennan who proferred a truly workable compromise. Rather than precluding the possibility of any editorial process privilege, as
the majority had done, he argued that there should be a qualified constitutional privilege
which would protect editors' "predecisional communications," id. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part), including "[i]deas expressed in conversations, memoranda, handwritten
notes and the like," id. at 193 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Herbert v. Lando,
568 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concurring), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)). This
privilege, however, would be subject to the public figure's ability to establish, to the trial
judge's satisfaction, a prima facie case of the defamatory publication's falsity. Id. at 197
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part). This prima facie showing would make the claim of injured
reputation "specific and demonstrable," and thus, the privilege could not be invoked. Id.
Had the majority adopted Justice Brennan's compromise, some of the fears of extended
discovery might have been eliminated. For example, if the defendant was assured that the
court would grant his motion for summary judgment upon the plaintiff's failure to demon-
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The State Response and the Potentialfor Forum Shopping
In recognizing the state interest in compensating private individuals for defamatory injury, the Gertz Court permitted the
states to adopt their own fault standards for defamation actions
brought by non-public personalities. 1 4 Subsequently, the vast majority of states adopted an ordinary negligence standard,14 with
most applying the preponderance of evidence standard coupled
with the requirement that plaintiffs prove falsity.148 A minority of
states, in contrast, have rejected an ordinary negligence standard
in the belief that it would not afford sufficient protection to media
defendants and have instead employed either a gross negligence
standard1 47 or variations of the New York Times actual malice
strate prima facie falsehood, the potential for self-censorship might be curtailed. See generally The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REv. 149, 160 (1979).
14 418 U.S. at 349-50. For an overview of the response of the various jurisdictions to
Gertz, see FRANCOIS, MASS MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 123-29 (2d ed. 1978); Collins &
Dhushal, The Reaction of the State Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CASE W.L.
REv. 306, 311-21 (1978); Frakt, supra note 107, at 536-47; Spencer, Establishment of Fault
in Post-Gertz Cases, 25 ST. Louis L.J. 374, 378-83 (1977).
" E.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976),
aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1979); Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 315,
560 P.2d 1216, 1222 (1977); Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 4, 8, 356
A.2d 472, 475 (Super. Ct. 1975); Phillips v. Evening Star Newspapers Co., 2 MED. L. RPTR.
2201, 2206 (D.C. 1977); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 537, 543
P.2d 1356, 1366 (1975); Troman v. Wood, 63 Ill. 2d 184, 188, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1976);
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 233, 531 P.2d 76, 84 (1975); General Motors
Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 171, 352 A.2d 810, 814-15 (1976); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf,
276 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367
Mass. 349, 356, 330 N.E.2d 161, 168 (1975); Walters v. Sanford Herald, 2 MED. L. Rpm.
1959, 1960 (N.C. 1976); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E. W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App.
2d 105, 110, 334 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 89 (Okla. 1976); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569
S.W.2d 412, 418 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819-20
(Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash.
2d 439, 445, 546 P.2d 81, 85 (1976).
141 E.g., Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1976).
It should also be noted that a number of states no longer permit punitive damages in
defamation actions. See, e.g., Dixon v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977);
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 349, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975);
Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 100-01, 593 P.2d 777, 778-79 (1979).
In Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882
(1975), the court struck down an award of $500,000 in punitive damages as excessive. Actual
damages were assessed at $250,000. The court mandated that punitive damages could only
be levied if the actual damage award "is insufficient to dissuade others in like circumstances
from committing similar acts in the future." It reasoned that a verdict of $750,000 would
lead to self-censorship. Id. at 692.
"4 See, e.g., Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert.
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test. 148 For example, in Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch,49
the New York Court of Appeals analyzed the Gertz decision' 50 and
fashioned the following standard of liability where the material at
issue was "arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern": "[T]o warrant ... recovery [a plaintiff] must establish, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a
grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the
standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily
followed by responsible parties.'"15
Although the potential for increased liability under differing
state fault standards presents a threat to the media, particularly in
those states employing ordinary negligence, a more compelling concern is the uncertainty of the approach state courts will take on
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196,
341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
", See, e.g., AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
's 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
1 0 Id.
at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64. In analyzing Gertz, the
Chapadeau court noted that:
The court felt that private individuals are more vulnerable because they lack a
forum to rebut the false statements and that they are more deserving of recovery
because they have not thrust themselves into the vortex of public controversy.
Consequently, the court concluded that the States should be accorded "substantial latitude" in fashioning a remedy based on fault.
Id.
151Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64. The intermediate New York appellate courts have not applied Chapadeau's gross negligence standard to defamation actions involving non-media defendants. Rather, common-law defamation standards have
been applied. See, e.g., WDM Planning, Inc. v. United Credit Corp., 62 App. Div. 2d 940,
404 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dep't 1978) (mem.), reu'd on other grounds, 47 N.Y.2d 50, 389 N.E.2d
1099, 416 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1979); Neufield v. Schachner, 61 App. Div. 2d 952, 403 N.Y.S.2d 41
(1st Dep't 1978) (mem.); Levine v. Kiss, 47 App. Div. 2d 544, 363 N.Y.S.2d 101 (2d Dep't
1975) (mem.). But see Rupert v. Sellers, 65 App. Div. 2d 473, 475, 411 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (4th
Dep't 1978) (Cardamone, J., concurring).
In a pre-Gertz case, the New York Court of Appeals, held that the qualified privileges
which extend to the news media may apply as well to the non-media defendant. Trails West,
Inc. v. Wolff, 32 N.Y.2d 207, 298 N.E.2d 52, 344 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1973). In Trails West, the
court ruled that "[o]nce public concern or interest is shown ... the privilege applies, and it
matters not who the defendant is." Id. at 217, 298 N.E.2d at 57, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 870. This
connection between public interest and privilege may show a heavy reliance on Rosenbloom,
making the application of Trails West questionable after Gertz. Under another analysis,
however, the court's decision may indicate an apparent proclivity to confer a privilege on a
non-media defendant if a media defendant is named as a co-defendant. See Cottom v. Meredith Corp., 65 App. Div. 2d 165, 411 N.Y.S.2d 53 (4th Dep't 1978); Wehringer v. Newman,
60 App. Div. 2d 385, 400 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't 1978); Commercial Programming Unlimited v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 50 App. Div. 2d 351, 378 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1st
Dep't 1975).
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the question of damages. The Gertz Court, which permitted states
to award damages for "actual injury," stated that it need not define that term because "trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say
that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss . . . [and
may] include impairment of reputation . . . personal humiliation,
and mental anguish and suffering.' 1 52 The inherent danger of not
defining actual injury is illustrated by the Firestone majority's
conclusion that Mrs. Firestone's $100,000 verdict, "premised entirely on the injury of mental pain and anguish,"' 153 did not "warrant. . . reexamining.'6 This result is ominous indeed in light of
the proof offered by Mrs. Firestone-the testimony of her friends,
neighbors, minister, and attorney' 5 5-and becomes dangerously
close to an award of presumed damages, i.e., an award premised on
the notion that the insult is the injury. Should states adopt the
Firestone concept of injury, it is quite conceivable that plaintiffs
and their attorneys will be encouraged to litigate. Moreover,
mental anguish, injury, and the like generally are not discoverable
and jury determinations of such injuries are unpredictable. Thus,
the media defendant will be threatened by increased litigation, economic burden, and perhaps, non-contestable, exorbitant liability.
The potential plight of interstate news agencies or national
wire services is also most interesting to contemplate. On a daily
basis, for example, an event of regional or national interest may be
published "on the wire." It is certainly within the realm of possibility that a number of such wire service stories may contain defamatory comments or allegations concerning a private person involved in a matter of public interest. While the protection afforded
to such a publication in New York under the "gross irresponsibility" standard established in Chapadeaumay afford sufficient protection to the publisher in that jurisdiction, the identical publication may result in liability in Massachusetts, for example, which
applies a simple or ordinary negligence test to determine liability. 158 As a consequence, it seems that first amendment forum
shopping may constitute a concept whose time has come of age.
I12

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.

153Firestone, 424 U.S. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'B'

'8

Id. at 461.
Id. at 460-61 & n.6.
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 349, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975).
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court decisions in the post-Gertz era represent
a significant retreat from the media safeguards established during
the New York Times-Rosenbloom years. Once protected in an almost absolute sense, the media now may be subject to a greater
number of plaintiffs released from the burden of proving actual
malice. The Court's Wolston and Hutchinson decisions indicate
that proving voluntary limited-issue public figure status will be an
onerous task. Thus, the class of plaintiffs subject to the New York
Times standard is apparently comprised primarily of public officials and famous public personalities. In addition, media defendants will be facing the vast majority of private individual plaintiffs
in state forums that have adopted an ordinary negligence standard.
Finally, the extensive discovery endorsed by the Lando Court forebodes increased litigation costs, a decrease in the use of summary
judgment, and a possible lightening of the burden of proving actual
malice. In summary, the media defendant now faces potentially increased litigation and greater litigation costs. To prevent a realization of these possibilities, the media may have to resort to extensive self-censorship.
Whether the next flurry of activity comes in applying new
standards of reportorial accuracy to investigative journalists or in
heralding the jury system as the ultimate savior of first amendment freedoms, the media lament continues with little, if any, relief in sight. Members of the media, the public, the bench and bar
have witnessed the creation, evolution and rejection of first amendment principles and concepts in a time span of less than two decades. While numerous precedents have endured the test of time
and are encrusted with tradition, the 16 years following the Court's
New York Times decision establish, at least in this area of the law,
that stare decisis is a relatively meaningless concept.

